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""""""""Rigidity of command is a feature of many dictatorships, but not an inherent one. The forces of Nazi Germany, for instance, were far more flexible than those of the allies."""""""

Dave if you believe this then you seriously need to re-read your history. Thruout the war German military field commanders were constantly hamstrung by a lack of flexability, shall not retreat orders, split command structures, and Hitlers interferance in the smallest details. Its one of the biggest reasons the Germans lost.

Where in his orders was Nagumo ordered to leave the PH area on 7 Dec? That he did is a reflection of the ultra rigid subordination that hampered Jap commanders thruout the war. There was no other operation or target of more importance, at that time, then the US fleet. All other operations should have been put on hold. Yaknow Dave history has proved me right on this.

"""""""""Sure they could. That would have left them starting the war with six aircraft carriers rather than eight. The US would more than recover from that. In December 1942, the first ESSEX was commissioned. By then they had also commissioned twelve CVEs. By December 1943, they had commissioned six more ESSEX CVs, seven INDEPENDENCE CVLs, and thirty-three CVEs. Compare that to Japan which commissioned only thirteen CV/CVL and sixteen CVE, including pre-war ships, by the end of the war."""""""""

To begin with Im not takeing the stand that the Japs could have won WWll if they could have knocked out the carriers at PH. Not 2 or 8 of them. There was no way the Japs could have won the war no matter what they did. They didnt have the power to invade America and eventually American industry would swamp them.

What Im saying is they made a huge military mistake in their attack on PH. At the time loseing 2 carriers would have been a much bigger loss then the destruction of those BBs, which were WWl designs anyway. They couldnt keep up with fleet carrier operations and would always be vulnerable to air power. The future was going to be fleet carriers no matter what happened. It would have hurt America much worse if the sub base had been attacked, or the depots, or support infrustructure. But no matter what America would have eventually won the war.

""""" This meant all those capital ships were available on fairly short notice if needed during the 1950s. It wasnt until the late fifties and early sixties that the USN disposed of those ships.""""""

Yeah but in reality these BBs werent capable of speeds that allowed them to participate in modern naval deployments and there was never any serious consideration given to activate them. And "short notice" is relative. It would take many months to train crews for them, get them ready for battle..ect These old BBs were obsolete.

""""""""In fact, this doctrine was mostly developed pre-war, and the IOWAs had been designed well before Pearl Harbor to act as a fast wing to the battle fleet. Indeed, all the IOWAs completed were laid down nearly a year before Pearl Harbor between June 1940 and January 1941""""""

Nope the doctrine evolved thruout the war. The sucess of carrier ops at PH wasnt lost on American planners either. After PH,for a year or two, we were left with carriers and subs as main striking elements. This reality kick started the evolvement of US fleet carrier doctrine.

""""""""""In hindsight, they needed to hold a victory parade down Pennsylvania Avenue to beat the United States. This was about as likely. At best, they could have caused the USN a few months of serious inconvenience. """""""""

Agreed, but they still should have fought a smarter war.

""""""""I see. You mean at the highest levels, not at the formation level and below. When OKW/OKH wasnt interfering, German commanders had as much or more freedom to carry out their assigned tasks. Of course you do recall that democracies are most definitely not immune to being micromanaged from the political leadership. Remember LBJ and MacNamara? Remember Desert 1?
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Vietnam was the one exception, and LBJ was an idiot. The only interferance George SR did was when he ended the war. All other military strategic/tactical decisions were made by military commanders. Hitler even made field commanders sign a "no retreat order", which was pure folly. He even personaly micro-managed even the most trivial matters.

""""""I posted it. immediately after the attacks. Again, your ignoring both the strategic situation and the critical shortage of fuel."""""

Post it again. Where did it say "you have to withdraw on exactly 7 Dec, and after only attacking one day"? Regardless of that days outcome"? There was enough wiggle room in his orders to allow him to, at least, attack the subs and infrustructure. Without which being attacked the battle was a failure. "After the attacks" meant what? An attack of one day or three?

"""""""Actually, there was: the Dutch East Indies. They needed that oil immediately. That was the entire reason to go to war. They were going to move on that timetable even before Pearl Harbor was contemplated""""""

It takes time to harness and exploit a regions resources. Anyway it doesnt matter. They had three strategic goals to accomplish in their "master plan". In order of importance, and in order are, 1, cripple the American pacific fleet. #2, Overrun the resource rich areas of S/E Asia. #3, Extend the defensive perimeter outward from their sphere of Influance. Those were the goals! Now you cant proceed to #2 befoe you accomplish #1. Ther reason the Japs left the Pearl after day 1 is because Nagamu thought he accomplished #1. He didnt!

The failure at PH brought about the Jap failures at Coral sea and Midway. Many people think that Midway happened due to Doolittle. Thats only partialy tru, Yamamoto had been pushing for the Midway plan for months, he knew PH was a failure and they needed to finish the job. He ran into a lot of opposition from the High Command over this plan, and it probably would have never happened if those B-25s didnt embarrass the heck out of the generals. Thats what got his Midway plan the green light.

It all came down to many in the Jap HC thinking PH was a victory. They didnt understand modern warfare, and most of all modern naval warfare. The Yank subs were even a concern to them because in the Jap naval mindset submarines were just recon and spy vehicles. Americans considered them warships in their own right, and after we got the torpedo problems solved the Jpa paid a heavy price for their stupidity.

"""""""In other words, even completing the mission as planned without loitering risked them running short of fuel. The longer they stayed around Hawaii, the more intensive the combat operations, the more they faced a very real risk of being stranded in the middle of the Pacific""""""""

And because of their timidity they were forced to go all the way back to Midway, with a huge force, and waste fuel "and 4 carriers" because they failed to finish the job at PH. Then add on all the fuel wasted on the Aluetians adventure. Do they still have them? Who cares?

And then they end their naval war by sending some of the most important assets, they have left, on a suicide mission which is "one-way" in their fuel allottment. Please point me to info your posting about regarding their exact fuel levels at PH?

""""""Then they would never have gone to war at all as destroying the USN was clearly impossible and they knew it. The bet they could hope for was that a few months of unrestricted offensive would be enough to cause the US to lose heart and negotiate a peace on Japanese terms. Pearl Harbor as carried out did give them this.""""""

6 months, they wanted 6 months. Even this was silly. What was 6 months going to get them? Coral sea was exactly 6 months to the day after PH. They lost at CS cause they didnt finish the job at Midway,or at least didnt cripple the Yank navy worse. Just hitting the fuel depots and infrustructure would ahve helped them immensly.

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Yeah but in reality these BBs werent capable of speeds that allowed them to participate in modern naval deployments
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Odd then that they fulfilled that function during the war. Except for the five old Standards, the World War II built ships were quite fast enough to operate with CVBGs. The ships that slowed them down were the escorts. In bad weather, the battleships and carriers could maintain close to their maximum speeds. The DDs were slowed considerably.""""""

Do I need to post the top speed of these Dreadnaught era battlewagons? C'mon Dave, now your argueing for the sake of argueing.

"""""""""Sorry, thats not the case. That doctrine was mostly worked out in the fleet exercises of the late thirties. """"""""

In Jan '29 the US navy accomplsihed a successful mock attack on the Panama canal useing the carrier's Lexington and Saratoga. The US Navy had worked on carrier doctrine prior to the war. However it was in its infancy. The destruction of the BBs at PH did push the carriers to the forefront, as it did the subs. Please post the fleet exercises in the '30s that "set in stone" American carrier doctrine for WWll?

"""""""""'Why should they have been smarter in 1941 than everyone else? If they were battleship focused, then so was every other navy at the time. The US stopped building battleships in WWII mostly because they could not be completed before the likely end of the war. Consider that the US could build and commission an ESSEX or INDEPENDENCE in as little as fourteen months or a CVE in as little as seven compared to three years for a battleship, its no wonder the wartime navy ended up with thirteen ESSEX, along with nine IDEPENDENCE, and over a hundred CVE as opposed to ten new battleships"""""""""

Thats not why we stopped building battleships after the war. We stopped building them because WWll changed their role from that of Offensive capitol ship to a secondary escort/amphib support ship. Simply, they just werent worth the money,manpower, and quay space for the mission they could now fullfill. Im not saying BBs werent still useful but they werent major players in naval warefare anymore. They were now escort for carriers and amphib gun support ships. The future was now written on the wall for all to see. To build more BBs, and to man them, was now a waste of resources. The fleet carrier was now king of the worlds oceans.

They should have been "smarter then everyone else" cause they saw how well the new doctrine worked at PH. Yeah they were unapposed, and yeah they left to many targets intact, but generally PH proved Yamamto right about the use of his carriers, and their now supreme importance. Then he goes and doeas something stupid like splitting his forces at Midway and leaveing his main carriers exposed.

""""""""""Except for the IOWAs, which did not generally operate as part of CVBGs in Korea, """"""""""

I didnt know NK had assets that could threaten a BB Dave, or a carrier? , or a rowboat?. Gee yathink that had something to do with it?

""""""""Here's a link to an article about the pre-war Fleet Problems.

I won't respond to the rest of your last post, as I realize I would only be repeating what I've already written. If you can't read the Operations Order or insist on disputing that fast battleships like the NORTH CAROLINA's did carrier escort during the """""""""

Dave are you pouting? Now when I myself post about a naval problem ran in 1929 why then would you assume I said there "werent any". Then you seem to take a position that carrier operations didnt "evolve" dureing the war. What are you talking about "North Carolina"? Were the ND class one of those WWl era BBs sunk at PH? What are you talking about?

Prior to PH the American navy still considered their BBs to be a significant portion of their striking power. After PH they didnt, and the reason was because they'd just lost a bunch of them. Also the attack at PH sunk it into even the most conservative mind that naval air power was the future. Hers a link that explains my point, I dont know the proper UB codes www.geocities.com/Pentago...ctics.html

To say that carrier tactics didnt evolve during the war is, to me, sheer fantasy. You could say that the Essex class was designed BEFORE the war. But advanced radar, carrier based fighter/bomber aircraft, proximity shells, and true Fleet task forces were what made the Essex class so lethal. And these evolved DURING the war.

"""""""" In 1944, the Japanese could scout at a range of 560 miles and attack at a range of 400 miles. The American were in a worse condition. They could scout out to just 350 miles and attack at 200 miles. (Reynolds 139) However, this deficiency was largely negated due to new invention of radar. Radar had many uses and was a very important influence on carrier warfare. Radar could attacking enemy aircraft, direct friendly intercepting aircraft, direct anti-aircraft, and find the enemy fleet. (Hughes 116) Radar was also fitted on 5in. anti-aircraft shells. These proximity shells exploded when near the target, instead of with a time fuze. (Hughes 116,132)

At the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay in 1943, seven US ships were attacked by 100 Japanese aircraft. Because the attack was detected with radar, the ships had time to prepare for the attack and radar allowed land-based aircraft to intercept them. The Japanese strike was ineffective, losing 17 planes for two small hits. American anti-aircraft sent up 35 shells per second. (Hughes 132-3)

Due to increased anti-aircraft ability and the greater numbers of carriers available, a new method of forming carrier task groups was necessary. In the Fifth Fleet, there were 15 carriers. It would be impossible to control 15 carriers each with its own screen. Therefore, task groups consisted of four carriers, three to five cruisers, and twelve to fourteen destroyers. With this method, there were only four separate carrier groups. The effective anti-aircraft protection made them safe from enemy attack. The Japanese had fewer had fewer carrier and lacked escorting ships. Therefore, they gave a screen of 12 escorts to a group of two carriers""""""""