Washington claimed nine 16in hits on Kirishima at ranges between 8400 and 12,650 yards. The target was rated "silenced and out of control." This was forty minutes after fired ceased against Sendai, so it does not pertain to the US navy history page claim that Washington hit a light cruiser on her first salvo.
Most noteworthy Battleship of WWII
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 Tiornu |
Re: Washington's hits... | ||
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Posts: 87 (01/20/04 16:15:43) |
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/20/04 19:13:29) |
T if you want to disagree with me then do so. But dont just say I dont know what Im talking about, and then recomend some books for "others" to read. Its really beneath a history buff to act like that. Japan fought her carriers well only once in the war, as far as Im concerned. And that was at Pearl Harbor. Even then they made fundemental and inexusable mistakes, at least in targeting. #1, of course , they should have known the Yank carriers werent there. Any attack that didnt account for them was a failure. And then to attack a fleet base and not attack the fuel depots/repair yards for the enemy fleet is madness. The Japs assembled the most powerful carrier task force the world had ever seen and then commit two inexusable blunders. Yamatos Pearl plan ONLY placed carrier targets as a slightly higher priority then battleships. This not only reflected the "battleship happy" thinking of the Japs, it eventually lost the war for them. "They" thought they had scored a great victory cause they sunk a bunch of Yank battlewagons "more reflection". So what do they do, "now haveing overwhelming air superiority in the PH area"? They congratualte themselves and go home. The Jap fear of a counter strike from the US carriers "which they had no idea where they were at" is not credible. They had the upper hand, they should have pressed on, kept up the pressure, tried to locate the carriers...ect What was Nagumo thinking? At Midway, to separate their most important asset, their four main carriers, from a so called "main body"? Why would you separate the most important asset of your navy from many of their pickets? Everyone of those ships, includeing Yamato, was expendable at Midway except their carriers. I have been somewhat negative of Admiral Yamato. In truth he was probably the closest thing to a visionary the Japs had. But even he failed. By the meaningless diversion to the Aluetians, and by not makeing his Midway force one large hammer, he diluted his forces at the time they were most needed to be cohesive. His plan was flawed. And luck was on our side. A little codebreaking didnt hurt either. Be that as it may Yamato knew that 4 Essex class carriers were 1/2 done, as well as a slew of fast CVs and CVEs. He knew the American naval shipbuilding capacity, he knew our naval heritage. And he knew that the takeing of a few atolls, so far from our shores, was essentially meaningless. What WAS critical was destroying American carriers and they failed at both Pearl and Midway. The Jap Midway plan, if I remember right, placed the landings as "secondary". My thesis is that the landings, be they Midway or the Aluetians, were irrelvant. They shouldnt have even been part of the plan, these assets would have been to far from Japan to maintain with their limted resources. Besides the window to take Pearl had already closed. Once the Yank carriers were destroyed the Japs could return to consolidate gains in their Asian sphere. MOST of ALL, taking Australia. It would have taken America 3 years to seriously contest their Asia conquests. And being wrapped up in Europe would we have? Or would we have worked out a peace of some sort? You see, even a fine strategist like Yamato was flawed in his planning. In his defense he probably wouldnt have put Nagumo in command of Midway. As far as he was concerned Nagumo lacked vision, as he showed in his unforgivable mistakes at Pearl. Yes Goh both the Yamatos were fine ships. But they would have better served a purpose if they were used as "bullet catchers" for the all important carriers. We speak of Mitchell and his vision. I will add that any mistakes made in carrier force deployment, or capitol ship construction, after Nov 1940 and the Brit attack at Taranto, by any side in the war. Was unforgivable! To have launched Yamato with such an atrocius AA suite was really poor thinking and design. Her 18.1s gave her range, but range beyond the capacity of her FC . So tell me what good did they do her? Besides making her a swell ship for computer games. Her armor was levethian, but still a single torp from a expendable submarine put her back in dry-dock, where she spent most of the war anyway. What was her input at Santa Cruz, indeed all of Guadalcanal? Other then delivering oil and hosting dinners on? "Again Yamato forgot the lessons learned with Pearl and diluted his forces". Anyway, Im digressing. Comments welcome. |
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binder001 |
Japanese naval tactics... | ||
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Posts: 16 (01/20/04 19:55:02) |
Slightly off the thread (about BB's), but you commented on Yammamoto and his tactical dispositions. Yammamoto was very bright and a realist about long-term combat with America, but he was still the product of his national heritage and training. What did the Kido Butai have at Paerl Harbor that they rarely had in later battles? Audacity and simplicity! I agree with other naval writers who comment that Japanese attack plans tended to be overly complex, and relied on their enemy responding exactly as planned. Too many times the Japanese screwed themselves with plans that had multiple task forces converging against an inflexible timetable. Wether it was poor commo or the inflexibility of the plan, the US was often able to deal with one force at a time. I think Yammamoto was simply doing what he was trained to do, plus he had a dose of "victory disease". The US fleet was to respond to the threat at Midway exactly as he planned and would stumble into his trap. Actually few of his plans after Pearl Harbor really worked as planned.
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Dave AAA |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 315 (01/21/04 00:30:43) |
Quote:Nagumo had time and resources for two strikes only. His priority was properly the American battle fleet. Quote:Among other things, they were needed in South east Asia to support the main thrust of Japanese operations there and in the Indian Ocean. They also didn't have the logistics to stay on station that far from base. Quote:Considering that up to this point in the war, battleship actions were the rule, rather than the exception, I'm not surprised that Japan put such emphasis on them. So far no battleship at sea had been sunk by aircraft, except in a SINKEX. Quote:The Main Force were not pickets, they were mostly much slower than the carriers and needed their own escorts. Tying the carriers to them would have been tactically unsound. Quote:The purpose of a Midway invasion, was to lure the US fleet into a decisive battle against the IJN. Had they thought the USN would be waiting for them, and they had no reason to think it would be, they would have made a different plan. The only reason the US was waiting for them was SIGINT and cryptanalysis. I Quote:So one can always expect to be able to ambush the enemy battle fleet in port? Did torpedo boats and submarine delivered commandos make battleships obsolete too? You do know that after Taranto, the Mediterranean war was still largely a contest between surface fleets. |
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/21/04 20:58:23) |
"""""""Nagumo had time and resources for two strikes only. His priority was properly the American battle fleet.""""""""
He had the resources. Unfortunately for them he sent some up to the Aluetians. """"""Among other things, they were needed in South east Asia to support the main thrust of Japanese operations there and in the Indian Ocean. They also didn't have the logistics to stay on station that far from base. Quote:"""""""" Dave there was no point in consolidateing those gains while the US Navy was still a deadly menace. With those carriers still un-accounted for there was no "real victory" at Pearl. """""""Considering that up to this point in the war, battleship actions were the rule, rather than the exception, I'm not surprised that Japan put such emphasis on them. So far no battleship at sea had been sunk by aircraft, except in a SINKEX.""""""""" At Taranto the Brits showed what a danger, even 1920s era aircraft were to capitol ships. Yamato was vastly impacted and impressed by that battle. It should also be noted that Bismarck was brought to heel by another 20s era, carrier launched, aircraft/torpedo. The US Navy first flew an airplane off a ship in 1910. In Jan 1929 Lexington and Saratoga participated in a mock naval carrier suprise attack, against the Panama canal, that profoundly impacted naval tacticians everywhere. But you are right in respects that nothing changes slower then a traditional military. The Japanese were very tradition bound. """"""""""The Main Force were not pickets, they were mostly much slower than the carriers and needed their own escorts. Tying the carriers to them would have been tactically unsound"""""""" The Kaga had a top speed of 28 knots. The Akagi 31 knots. Shokaku class 34 knots. I assume they had to go as fast as the slowest ship. The striking force had a picket assigned to it. 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, and a squadron of destroyers. Most of which werent as fast as the faster carriers. In the main body, which BTW never saw action, was Yamato, Nagato, and Mutsu. The most powerful battleships they had, along with a destroyer force. What possible exuse could they have for not commiting these assets. Even worse, what exuse could they have for diluteing their forces with the meaningless Aluations campaign? It was irresponsable for them to think the US navy would give them the keys to Midway and Pearl by chaseing a task force up to the aleutians. Another "blunder" was Yamato knuckleing under to the army to assign several carriers to the attacks that led to "Coral Sea", which put 2 of his heavy carriers, and one light one, out of action for Midway. Again the Japs stupidly didnt assign the destruction of US carriers top priority. """"""""The purpose of a Midway invasion, was to lure the US fleet into a decisive battle against the IJN. Had they thought the USN would be waiting for them, and they had no reason to think it would be, they would have made a different plan. The only reason the US was waiting for them was SIGINT and cryptanalysis. I""""""""""" They were also going to land troops and occupy Midway. """"""""So one can always expect to be able to ambush the enemy battle fleet in port? Did torpedo boats and submarine delivered commandos make battleships obsolete too? You do know that after Taranto, the Mediterranean war was still largely a contest between surface fleets. """"""""" In port or not it didnt matter. Taranto highlighted the danger of carrier launched aircraft against capitol ships. And yes, advances in torpedos and torpedo launching platforms did further make obsolete the logic of building massive battleship fleets. When a $75,000 PT boat, or a $30,000 aircraft, can put out of action/sink a $10,000,000 Battleship I would say its time to start re-thinking your prioritys. That WAS one of the major lessons of WWll naval warfare. What did pouring all those resources into battleships get the Germans? Would they have been better off getting some carriers finished, and escorts? Why were the Iowas the last battleships America built? And why did we cancel so many of them? Why werent the Montanas never built? Battleships DID become obsolete in and after WWll!!! |
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Dave AAA |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 315 (01/22/04 03:09:07) |
Quote:No he did not. He did not have the fuel to swan around Hawaii for another day while now vulnerable to air attack from Hawaii itself as well as at least two USN carriers somewhere at sea. As well, he did not have the time to rearm and launch a third strike and still have enough daylight to recover their aircraft. Quote:When stationary, in port, with unalerted sir defences, and you mean mid 1930's era aircraft. In spite of Taranto, the Mediterrean campaign was, as I said, mostly a surface to surface battle. Quote:Look up the top speed of NAGATO and MUTSU. Quote:Considering they were fighting the war to take that area, the army was already involved and needed the air cover, the USN was not, Coral Sea not withstanding, able to prevent them from taking it, and that this is where their logistics could support the Japanese fleet, this was no error. Quote:After WWII, yes. During it, no. Taranto didn't prove it, nor did Pearl Harbor any more than Port Arthur proved it in 1905. Even PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE only proved that a large number of aricraft could sink isolated battleships without air cover or AA escort, just as they could sink any ship. The fact remains that battleships were the most powerful day/night, all weather ASuW platforms until the 1950's. The fact is that given air parity, the side with a batter battleship fleet would win. The fact is that in the North Atlantic and north of Norway, carriers were often ineffective while battleships still fought. |
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Gohbhined |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 55 (01/22/04 10:44:20) |
USAF, I am currently reading a very good book called, Pacific War, by John Costello, and it is one of the most detailed account I have read about that era in history. I recommend it. Costello goes into depth about Pearl Harbor and Midway. The Japanese did consider continuing the attack on Pearl Harbor, specifically, the dock machinery and fuel tanks, but they felt, with surprise gone, that it was unacceptable to loiter within range of land-based air , especially when the location of the American carriers were unknown. Nagumo tried to duplicate another Pearl Harbor in the Indian Ocean against the British, but failed to achieve surprise, and destroyed the port facilities instead, as no ships were caught in port. They didnt hang around then, neither. In fact, virtually all of the early Japanese victories counted on surprise. When they didn't have it, their battle plans went awry (Wake Island, Battaan). They came close to getting pasted early on, but Allied incompetence (Repulse and Renown debacle) and luck (ABDA missing 30+ undefended IJN transports), were something they could count on.
Midway happened for one reason and one reason only. The Doolittle raid. It was unacceptable to have American carriers popping up from time to time bombing "sacred land". The IJN had already lost face by allowing such an attack to take place and failed at the pursuit of the Hornet, in spite of most of their navy searching for it. The plan was to eliminate the US carriers. Grabbing Midway as an outpost was a bonus. Invading Pearl Harbor was never seriously entertained. As for splitting up his attack into 3 different forces...well, I am sure they wanted to maintain surprise and confusion as to their intentions, as such large fleet movements are hard to keep a lid on. The light carriers in Alaska would not have thrown much into the Midway battle, and most likely would have followed their bigger sisters into the depths, as their aircraft would have been rearming as well. I feel you are coming down too harshly from a hindsight point of view on the Japanese. They truly did an amazing thing that first year of war with what they had. Especially when you compare their equipment with what the Allies had...lousy small arms, lousy artillery, lousy tanks, hell, they didnt even have decent AP bombs! |
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/22/04 20:14:02) |
The Japs had fleet oilers in their PH order of battle. I assume they had the resources available to presecute the attack on the 8'th. "If" they didnt assign enough oilers, and I believe they did, then they compounded their PH failure.
Goh the intial attacks on PH airfields put out of action 2/3s of US offensive fighter/bomber strength. Nagumo was an overly-cautios CO without vision. To break off the attack, while in such a superior position, and leaveing such important targets intact, is undefensable. It would be a mistake to think Midway ONLY happened due to the Dollittle raid, which BTW was militarily insignificant. Midway happened because PH failed. That the light carriers "Alaska" wouldnt have made much impact wasnt the point, by sending them north ensured they would make no impact whatsoever. Dave the Japs didnt not absolutely need Port Moresby. What they needed to do was destroy the main Yank fleet. "Fighting the war to take that area" is irrelevant. In war you have to prioritze, and any effort to consolidate gains should have had a lower priority then destroying the Yank carriers. TBOCS happened due to jap army pressure to attack a target that had a lower priority then naval matters at hand. Because of this flawed thinking they had 2 less fleet carriers at Midway. Im afraid your wrong about the Med Dave. Air power sunk far more shipping in that theatre then "surface forces". If anything the Med campaign was a poster child for air power. The Brits had 3 major fleet carriers in the Med for most of the war. You seem to have this "thing" against carriers , and seem to think they were only effective against battleships that were "stationary" "in port" or with "no AA defenses". I dont get it. Gunfire exchanges by major surface combatants was fairly rare in the war. Airpower and subs were a far,far greater danger. The geography of the Med, and the location of land bases in range of shipping routes, made land based aircraft a greater threat then carrier based. Many aircraft that originated on carriers ended up takeing off from land bases prior to attcking due to tactical considerations. Boy I dont know where you got this one from Dave. The Fairey SWordfish first flew in 1934. It wasnt much better then 20s vintage aircraft, it was a bi-plane that was extremely slow, was helpless against enemy fighters, and still put out of action 3 Italian battleships,a cruiser or two, destroyers, other ships, and the Brits only lost two of them. BTW which battleships were ASW platforms? So let me get this right. Aircraft could only sink "isolated battleships that had no AA escort". So other surface combatants were supposed to provide AA escort? So PFW and Repulse wouldnt have been sunk if they had AA escorts? I thought battleships were supposed to be the AA escorts. If they werent then what was? You know it was this kind of thinking that led to the destruction of the IJN. Until the end of the war they stubbornly believed the decisive battle would be won by battleships. What makes this line of thought even more unexusable is the fact that PH proved just the opposite """""The fact remains that battleships were the most powerful day/night, all weather ASuW platforms until the 1950's. """" Again what battleship was an ASW platform, be it day, night, or in bad weather? While were at it """"The fact is that given air parity, the side with a better battleship fleet would win. """"" what war, battle, or campaign is the basis for this statement? And "what" was different in 1950 as compared to 1945 regarding battleship/carrier effectivenss? In other words what happened "after the war" that made BBs obsolete that didnt happen dureing the war? """"""""The fact is that in the North Atlantic and north of Norway, carriers were often ineffective while battleships still fought. """"""""""""" No doubt you are referring to the loss of HMS Glorious to Gneisnau and Scharnhorst. First off the Brits were notorius for not assigning adequat escort forces to their carriers in that theatre. Glorius only had 2 destroyers for escorts. A year earlier they lost Courageous to a U-boat, again with only 2 destroyers as escorts. Secondly Glorious and her escorts had no radar, she had no aircraft flying patrol, had no aircraft ready to launch on the flight deck, in fact had no-one in the birds nest looking for enemy ships. The German ships already had her in range before they were even spotted. I'd say enemy aircraft were a constant threat to German warships dureing the war. """""""""""""No he did not. He did not have the fuel to swan around Hawaii for another day while now vulnerable to air attack from Hawaii itself as well as at least two USN carriers somewhere at sea. As well, he did not have the time to rearm and launch a third strike and still have enough daylight to recover their aircraft. Quote: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- At Taranto the Brits showed what a danger, even 1920s era aircraft were to capitol ships. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- When stationary, in port, with unalerted sir defences, and you mean mid 1930's era aircraft. In spite of Taranto, the Mediterrean campaign was, as I said, mostly a surface to surface battle. Quote: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Kaga had a top speed of 28 knots. . . . I assume they had to go as fast as the slowest ship. . . . In the main body, which BTW never saw action, was Yamato, Nagato, and Mutsu. . . . What possible exuse could they have for not commiting these assets. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Look up the top speed of NAGATO and MUTSU. Quote: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Another "blunder" was Yamato knuckleing under to the army to assign several carriers to the attacks that led to "Coral Sea", -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Considering they were fighting the war to take that area, the army was already involved and needed the air cover, the USN was not, Coral Sea not withstanding, able to prevent them from taking it, and that this is where their logistics could support the Japanese fleet, this was no error. Quote: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- That WAS one of the major lessons of WWll naval warfare. . . . Battleships DID become obsolete in and after WWll!!! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- After WWII, yes. During it, no. Taranto didn't prove it, nor did Pearl Harbor any more than Port Arthur proved it in 1905. Even PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE only proved that a large number of aricraft could sink isolated battleships without air cover or AA escort, just as they could sink any ship. The fact remains that battleships were the most powerful day/night, all weather ASuW platforms until the 1950's. The fact is that given air parity, the side with a batter battleship fleet would win. The fact is that in the North Atlantic and north of Norway, carriers were often ineffective while battleships still fought. """"""""""""" |
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Dave AAA |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 315 (01/23/04 00:21:15) |
Quote:They assigned all the oilers they had available for the operation, with all the available fuel. It still wasn't enough to stay on station around Hawaii. To break off the attack, while in such a superior position, and leaveing such important targets intact, is undefensable. Quote:They did absolutely need Indonesia and South East Asia and did need to neutralize the RN and allied forces in the Indian Ocean. Quote:This was beyond their capabilities. Most of the USN was not near Hawaii. At best, they might have added two carriers to their total, neutralized Pearl Harbor for a few weeks, and caused the USN to redeploy more carriers from the Atlantic. At best, they might have delayed the US response by a few months. Quote:And twice that many battleships. The key engagement between the fleets in the Med was Cape Matapan 28 Mar 41. It was primarily a surface engagement with air support. Like the sinking of the BISMARCK, it was a case of battleships getting the job done with the help of aircraft. Recall that it took two battleships to beat the German ship when two carriers could only slow it down with repairable damage. Quote:Yet oddly enough, the same number of battleships were sunk in WWII by battleship fire at sea as were sunk at sea by aircraft. Battleship fire HOOD BISMARCK SCHARNHORST KIRISHIMA YAMSHIRO Aircraft PRINCE OF WALES REPULSE ROMA YAMATO MUSASHI Quote:That's like saying carriers were self escorting because their AAW suites were as good or better than most battleships. Quote:That's A Su W, not ASW. Anti Surface Warfare. Quote:Guided weapons and all-weather attack aircraft. |
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Gohbhined |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 55 (01/23/04 08:31:47) |
USAF, you hit the spot about Nagumo being overly-cautious when he didnt have the full picture. One thing the US had from the get-go was the ability to do recon and attack outside the retalitory range of Japanese aircraft. The 2 aircraft that allowed this were the Catalinas and B-17's. In fact, the B-17's seemed to be included in the decision-making process of most, if not all, the Japanese battle plans. The Phillipines were taken out to deny B-17's from fire-bombing (per plan Orange) their cities (plan Orange was known to the Japanese). Too bad McArthur disobeyed orders and didnt move his aircraft south after PH, the invasion of the Phillipines would have been smashed.
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/23/04 09:16:28) |
"""""They did absolutely need Indonesia and South East Asia and did need to neutralize the RN and allied forces in the Indian Ocean.""""
Was it more imprtant then neutralizeing the American Navy? I think not. """""""""This was beyond their capabilities. Most of the USN was not near Hawaii. At best, they might have added two carriers to their total, neutralized Pearl Harbor for a few weeks, and caused the USN to redeploy more carriers from the Atlantic. At best, they might have delayed the US response by a few months. """""""""""""" Destroying the 3 carriers at Midway would have given the Japs a free hand in the Pacific. No-one was going to "bring anything" from the Atlantic. Nazi Germany was considered the more dangerous enemy and was going to be dealt with first regardless. Its my opinion, BTW, that the Japs would have eventually lost no matter what they did. """""Recall that it took two battleships to beat the German ship when two carriers could only slow it down with repairable damage. """""""" No-one is saying the battlewagons were useless. But the aircraft carrier was a developeing weapon thruout the war, culminateing in the Essex class. It also ended the war as the MAIN naval weapon. Its important to remember that, even with such outdated aircraft, it was air power that slowed the mighty Bismarck "hearing song in my head". """""""That's like saying carriers were self escorting because their AAW suites were as good or better than most battleships."""""""" The AA suite of a carrier wasnt even no-where near as complete as a Major Battlewagon. As far as I know the Essex calss only had 5" guns, 9 or 12 right? The Iowa class was bristleing with AA. The Jap carriers had AA suites that were fairly substantial, when compared to their battlewagons "for all the good it did them". The Yank Navy philosophy "rightly" used escort ships for AA duties. """""""Aircraft PRINCE OF WALES REPULSE ROMA YAMATO MUSASHI""""""""" Did you leave a few out Dave? A tied up battleship is still a battleship. You could even credit the battlewagons with a few more "French Fleet". Then you cant count the pockets, and if your really motivated you can throw in the heavy cruisers. In fact if you really wanted to you can include all the subd slaughtered by air power, as well as just about all of the Jap Navy. """""""''I thought battleships were supposed to be the AA escorts. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- That's like saying carriers were self escorting because their AAW suites were as good or better than most battleships."""""" This type of thinking hounded the Japs thru-out the war. The reality of naval war, and power projection, made BBs far more expendable then carriers. A carrier can project power 20X farther then a battleship and it grew, by wars end, into the ultimate weapon. The Japs on the other hand always had this fascination with a "glorius last stand" with their battleships. What happened to their 2 modern wagons was a reflection of the new naval reality. They were slaughtered like sheep by Essex class carrier born aircraft. """""Guided weapons and all-weather attack aircraft. """"" Far, far after WWll Dave. Some would even argue that a true "all weather" capabilty didnt happen until the A-6 Intruder came on-line. A to A missiles didnt appear until the late 50s, werent used by America until Vietnam. Precision attack missiles werent a reality until the 70s. |
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Dave AAA |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 315 (01/23/04 12:33:52) |
Quote:It was why they went to war in the first place. They needed those resources desparately. Their economy and their continuing war in China needed them, and they could not wait until the USN was eliminated. Quote:They had a free had in the Pacific already. They had a two to one advantage in carriers until Midway. Quote:It also helped that there were over a hundred in the USN compared to a quarter that many battleships. Quote:From Hazegray: Essex Class aircraft carrier: Armament: 4 dual, 4 single 5/38 DP, 18 quad 40 mm AA, 61 single 20 mm AA ; single 20 mm AA replaced late WWII/postwar by 35 dual 20 mm AA IOWA Class battleship: Armament: 3 triple 16"/50cal, 10 dual 5"/38cal, 19 quad 40 mm AA (Iowa: 18 ), 52 single 20 mm AA That's four more five inch, one more quad 40mm, and between nine and twenty-three fewer 20 mm on an IOWA compared to an ESSEX. Quote:Nope. A battleship in harbour is no more vulnerable than a carrier to attack from aircraft, submarines, or even other battleships, as at Mers-el-Kebir and Casablanca Quote:By nearly four hundred aircraft from eight carriers. Three hundred and fifty-six aircraft managed only fifteen hits on YAMATO. That was more than enough, of course, but note that it would take at least two carriers worth of aircraft to get enough hits to have a good chance of sinking any other WWII battleship. Quote:Not that far. The Germans had guided weapons in 1943 (the FX-1400). The Americans by 1945. |
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/23/04 15:34:22) |
""""""""""It was why they went to war in the first place. They needed those resources desparately. Their economy and their continuing war in China needed them, and they could not wait until the USN was eliminated.
Quote: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Destroying the 3 carriers at Midway would have given the Japs a free hand in the Pacific. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- They had a free had in the Pacific already. They had a two to one advantage in carriers until Midway. Quote:"""""""""""' No they didnt have a "free hand". If they had a "free hand" they wouldnt have been stopped in the Coral sea. The US Navy still had a credable force arrayed against them and they failed to prioritze the war. Unless they could nuetralize the US Navy all other military actions would eventually be contested. This attack was launched because they wanted to expand farther south, as well as control the sea lanes a round Northern Australia. All of this could have waited until the main American fleet was engaged. Now, because they put the cart before the horse, the Yanks had rough equality with them at Midway, instead of a Jap 2 to 1 advantage in carriers. """"By nearly four hundred aircraft from eight carriers. Three hundred and fifty-six aircraft managed only fifteen hits on YAMATO. That was more than enough, of course, but note that it would take at least two carriers worth of aircraft to get enough hits to have a good chance of sinking any other WWII battleship.""""" And how many American aircraft were lost in sinking these dinosaurs? Not to bad a trade eh? And what is your rational for saying it would ""take at least two carriers worth of aircraft to get enough hits to have a good chance of sinking any other WWII battleship"" """""""Not that far. The Germans had guided weapons in 1943 (the FX-1400). The Americans by 1945. """""""""" The Germans had the HS-293 family. Kindly list the American system/systems ? |
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Dave AAA |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 315 (01/23/04 18:46:39) |
Quote:They still had to leave the Hawaii area after the 7 December attack. They couldn't make a third strike and they couldn't stick around. They were needed in December in South East Asia. Had two US carriers not been available for Coral Sea or Midway, it would have meant little of importance to the eventual course of the war. They had no way to neutralize the USN no matter what they did at Pearl Harbor. Quote:I took three hundred and fifty-six aircraft to get fifteen hits. That means that it should take about one hndred to get five hits. Five hits seems to be enough to sink most treaty battleships. WWII fleet cariers carried about eighty aircraft. Quote:How about the VB series? And before you ask, night attack aircraft, like the AD-4N version of the Skyraider, were in service during the Korean War. |
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/24/04 09:49:30) |
"""""""""""They still had to leave the Hawaii area after the 7 December attack. They couldn't make a third strike and they couldn't stick around. They were needed in December in South East Asia.
Had two US carriers not been available for Coral Sea or Midway, it would have meant little of importance to the eventual course of the war. They had no way to neutralize the USN no matter what they did at Pearl Harbor."""""""" What "other target" was possibly more important then US carriers, submarines, naval machine shops, and the oil installations around PH? The Japs had enough assets to hold down the Brits in the Indian ocean, at least until a true victory was won around PH. """"""I took three hundred and fifty-six aircraft to get fifteen hits. That means that it should take about one hndred to get five hits. Five hits seems to be enough to sink most treaty battleships. WWII fleet cariers carried about eighty aircraft. """" Repulse, Prince of Wales were sunk by 84 aircraft, with 3 aircraft being lost. Look at the battle of The Sibuyan sea, where 260 allied aircraft took part. The Japs lost Musashi, had 2 other BBs damaged, as well as other cruisers and destroyers. I dont get this "amount of aircraft" thing your on. when in battle you throw everything you have at the enemy. Instead concentrate on what impact the Jap BBs mad ein the war, which wasnt much. And what impact hitting the Yank BBs at Pearl made, again which wasnt much. If anything PH forced the Americans to use carriers as true capitol ships. And we never looked back. Your reasoning is flawed. One well placed torpedo could knock out a BB. It doesnt matter "how many hits" what matters is "where", just like in a BB exchange. It took many hits to knock out a BB in a surface exchange as well. But in a surface exchange your risking your own ships. In a carrier attack you are only risking airplanes. """"How about the VB series? And before you ask, night attack aircraft, like the AD-4N version of the Skyraider, were in service during the Korean War. """"" The only American system was the "Bat" system that saw extremely limted use, and never from carrier based aircraft. True anti-ship missiles didnt come on-line until far after WWll. |
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Dave AAA |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 315 (01/24/04 15:04:04) |
Quote:And take the Dutch East Indies without aircover? This seems unlikely. Quote:In a few days, they would have been without fuel with no way to get home or resupply. Their on board tanks as well as their oilers would have been dry. There is no way they could have loitered around Pearl Harbor. Quote:As I've already pointed out, that is not correct, though I will freely admit the VB series needed B-24 sized aircraft to operate them. This does not help your argument that battleships were obsolete in the 1940's though. If anything, it means that they were still required as all-weather anti-ship systems for well into the 1950's - which is what I've been saying. |
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/25/04 17:06:16) |
I never said they could take the Dutch East Indies without their carriers Dave. I said striking down the Yank fleet, and PH support infrustructure, was a far more necessary/high priority mission then ANY S/E Asia amphibious op. We cant argue what the Japs did cause its now a matter of history, but we can argue the why. And the why is they blew it. I used to have a websight that listed the Jap cargo/tanker capacity in 1941 and now I cant find it. I cant remember how many tankers they had at PH but I do remember they had enough in their fleet to support an extended PH campaign. If they all werent present at PH then it compounds the Jap error.
The simple fact remains that it was at PH where they held their own strategic future in their hands. When they sailed west leaveing those targets intact, and those carriers afloat "somewhere" they should have known they already lost the war. Yamamoto knew. He was not at all happy with Nagumo. """""As I've already pointed out, that is not correct, though I will freely admit the VB series needed B-24 sized aircraft to operate them. This does not help your argument that battleships were obsolete in the 1940's though. If anything, it means that they were still required as all-weather anti-ship systems for well into the 1950's - which is what I've been saying."""""" Theres no basis for saying that. After Leyte there was never another BB/BB engagement. They were "obsolete" in their former role. Sure they still had value as an AA platform/carrier escort, and as a gunnery platform for amphib landings. It could be argued that they still had some value up to the Gulf War, which was the last time their big guns would fire. But dureing this time span anti-surface ship systems became much more lethal. The role of the battlship had changed forever. They from now on would only operate in support of carrier operations, or linked to carrier fleet commands. This is probably why we never built another one after '44 eh? And why we never built Montana. If they werent on the road to obsolescence then why didnt we ever build another one? No they werent completely obsolete. They remained great AA platforms and the Iowas 16" guns were welcome for fire support. But after WWll BBs would never again be able to operate without suffecient air protection. Any navy would be more then happy to sacrafice 100 airplanes to sink a capitol ship, and as the attacks on Yamato and Musashi showed, it often took much less then that. I'll say this as well. For a supposedly Martial people, the Jap Navy commanders in WWll showed a great deal of cowardness, indecision, and lack of resolve when compared to Yank Naval commanders. I see it at PH, in the Aluetions, at Midway, at Guadalcanal, Truk, Leyte. The Japs just didnt fight a good naval war. |
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Dave AAA |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 315 (01/26/04 02:40:46) |
Quote:But you think they should have tried without them. Quote:Yet, knowing the situation, he let Nagumo make the decision. Nagumo followed his pre attack orders. Strike then withdraw. Staying another day for another attack was not in his orders, even if the logistics permitted it and his ships were not needed elsewhere.. It would also have been hazardous and unavailing. The weather had worsened to the point that an attack on Midway was cancelled. He was vulnerable to counter attack from land based air (131 USN and USAAC aircraft of all types, though he would not know the numbers). He had fifty aircraft written off December 7 (twenty-nine shot down) with thirty more damaged. He could expect worse on December 8 given that US air defences would be alert and prepared. It was more likely that he would have lost much of Kido Butai than inflict any irreparable damage on the USN, The US could well afford to lose two carriers and some of the shore facilities at Pearl while losing any major portion of their naval aviation would be disastrous fro Japan, as Midway showed.. my.execpc.com/~dschaaf/battle.html www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/pearl/CinCPac-A.htm www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-6.html Quote:. You'll note that there haven't been any CV/CV engagements since then either. After Leyte the IJN had neither the fuel nor the strength to conduct a major engagement against the USN. Quote:Considering the USN had nine modern battleships built or nearing completion at the time, they seem to have had enough. As well, America's closest Western allies had seven more. That was more than enough to counter the one modern Soviet battleship postwar. Quote:True enough, but not until the mid fifties when guided weapons became small enough for carrier use and the first anti-ship SSM's were introduced. Of course, postwar developments are irrelevant to the situation In 1941. Quote:You've chosen particularly poor examples to prove that seeing as they were attacked with over three hundred and over two hundred aircraft respectively. |
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USAFcop |
Re: Iowa design considerations... | ||
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Posts: 136 (01/26/04 12:17:27) |
"""""""""But you think they should have tried without them.
Quote:"""""""" I said they should have waited! Nagumo didnt follow his pre-attack orders. His pre-attack orders were to preemptively destroy the American fleet at PH. His orders said nothing about "attacking for one day and leaveing". Nagumo personaly disliked Yamamoto and thought his PH plan would fail "sound like a conflict of interest to you". He had 9 tankers in his fleet and Im sure he could have drummed up enough gas for one more "go". Even forgetting about the Yank carriers to leave such vital targets intact , as fuel depots, submarines, and machine shops, is just sheer stupidity. PH was the most important battle of the war, and they knew it. what "elsewhere" could be more important? The Japs knew they would win or lose the war based on the crippleing blow they could deliver at PH. The oil depots alone, if lost, would have crippled the Pacific fleet for at least a year. US air power on PH had taken a major hit on the 7th. The runways were damaged, there was much disorganization. Would we have put up a better fight on the 8th? sure! But in war you have to weigh the risks with the gains. And the Jap were in a position of strong air superiority. To say this """The US could well afford to lose two carriers and some of the shore facilities at Pearl while losing any major portion of their naval aviation would be disastrous fro Japan, as Midway showed.."" is just plain wrong. The US could NOT afford to lose 2 carriers at PH, couldnt afford to lose the shore facilities, and there was no way the Japs would have lost as much at PH as they did at Midway. What the Americans COULD afford to lose was some battleships and some airplanes. Which is what we did lose. """"""" You'll note that there haven't been any CV/CV engagements since then either. After Leyte the IJN had neither the fuel nor the strength to conduct a major engagement against the USN. """"""""" After Leyte they didnt even have a navy left ...period. No there hasnt been any CV engagements either. Thats cause the only ones to truly have a "real" CV navy is America. And we rule the worlds oceans with them. Other countrys have them however. Off-hand Britain, France, Argentina, India, Russia, and China bought one from the Russians. You dont see any navy with BBs now tho do you? """"""Considering the USN had nine modern battleships built or nearing completion at the time, they seem to have had enough. As well, America's closest Western allies had seven more. That was more than enough to counter the one modern Soviet battleship postwar""""""" ALL our BBs were decommisioned by 1948, except for Missouri, which was DC in 1955. All the Iowa class were decommisioned/recommisioned several times, all four were brought back for Korea. Each time they were brought back for gunnery support, and carrier escort. The final time was in the Mid 80s when Reagans 600 ship navy requirement gave the Iowas a lease on life. They were, at this time, a different ship, being that they were refurbished with Tomohawk , harpoon, and other modern systems. To the end the Iowas did a fine job doing what BBs had evolved into. Gunnery support and carrier escort. All other BBs the US Navy had in WWll were decommisioned in '46 or '47 . BBs had become bit players from 1942 on. """"""""Yet, knowing the situation, he let Nagumo make the decision. Nagumo followed his pre attack orders. Strike then withdraw. Staying another day for another attack was not in his orders, even if the logistics permitted it and his ships were not needed elsewhere.. It would also have been hazardous and unavailing. The weather had worsened to the point that an attack on Midway was cancelled. He was vulnerable to counter attack from land based air (131 USN and USAAC aircraft of all types, though he would not know the numbers). He had fifty aircraft written off December 7 (twenty-nine shot down) with thirty more damaged. He could expect worse on December 8 given that US air defences would be alert and prepared. It was more likely that he would have lost much of Kido Butai than inflict any irreparable damage on the USN, The US could well afford to lose two carriers and some of the shore facilities at Pearl while losing any major portion of their naval aviation would be disastrous fro Japan, as Midway showed..""" """"""""""""You've chosen particularly poor examples to prove that seeing as they were attacked with over three hundred and over two hundred aircraft respectively. """"""""" The point is "how many aircraft were lost"? And was it worth it? Sinking such an important enemy capitol ship is certainly worth the loss of many aircraft and pilots. And extremely certainly worth sending as many aircraft after them as you can. |
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binder001 |
Japanese war plans... | ||
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Posts: 16 (01/26/04 19:05:00) |
re: total destruction of Pearl Harbor and its support facilities: You forget that the Japanese were just as racist in their war planning and the Americans were. To all to many an American in 1941 a Japanese was a near sighted, simple-minded copier. To the Japanese the Americans were soft, easy living materialists with no moral fiber. The Japanese plan was not to destroy the USN (even though hindsight says they should have). In their view if the Americans received a severe enough blow, or series of blows, they would lack the courage to accept the sacrifices needed to take the Pacific back from Japan. The US was to accept the Japanese control of the western Pacific, sign a peace treaty and accept her humiliating defeat.
The Japanese navy also suffered from some of the same perverted version of Bushido that infected the army - repair docks and supplies were not as "honorable" a target as a warship. Look at how IJN submarines were used - in support of fleet activities and to take out warships. The carriers were powerful, but how much longer would it have take us to win the war if several regiments of Marines were sunk aboard their transports. re: "it took 356 planes to sink Yamato...", OK it did, but a carrier is not a one-shot weapon. The carrier is capable of repeated sorties as long as planes and weaponry last. The "big mission" in 1945 involved so many planes partly due to the perceived value of the target and also because we had so many planes and carriers available. Poor old Yamato and Musashi simply reinforced the lesson that surface ships can't operate against airpower with some air cover of their own! The USN's real strength in WW2 and after is the ability to fight in three dimensions - surface, sub-surface and air. After our torpedo problems were addressed the Japanese always had to face threats from underneath and overhead as well as on the surface. The Battle of the Kamandorski Islands was one of the few true "gun battles" in WW2. |
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