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Good Morning

Well I think you are right, I think we have just about beat this subject to death. So for me I'll just close this subject with this last post.

With the information you provided in your last post to me it shows that some of the LSTs and LCTs did have the capacity to carry the 11'6" M-26 to Normandy. Granted, as you said the low priority given to this tank it could not have been ready for Normandy. Yes the M-26 could only have been in limited numbers because of the load limits and the production low priority. But on a beach such as Normandy not being stormed and under fire. the crews could then have taken the time to thread the needle in some of the ships with tight fitting doors and ramps.

Also, now with the means to get the M-26 to Europe earlier, with out waiting for the French or low country ports to be cleared the troops could have been provided with a much better fighting tank earlier. Even in limited numbers the M-26 could have given the troops a lot more agressive fighting style. Take for instance the action in Calone squire near the church. When a Panther was discovered covering that area, the lone M-26 just went streight into the area after the panther. No trying for a side shot just streight forward. And firing on the move knocked out the Panther with 3 shots.
Now I cann't even a sherman crew doing that, it would have been suicide.

I have found another book and author who puts into words a lot better than me what I believe. It is the US Army in World War II (3) By Mark Henry. He got his info for this book from the 1st Infantry Division MUSEUM . Here is some quotes.

On the supply crisis in the ETO. despite America's apperently limitless manufacturing capacity and generous scales of issue for almost every necessity, one factor had a baleful effect on US operations. The Problem was not producing what was needed, or shipping it to Europe; it was getting it out of the ships and up to the front-line units when, where and in the quantited required. The overall supply situation in the ETO was por, due in about equal measure to shortages of transportation and bad decisions on logistics taken by the staff at SHAEF.
Eisenhower's staff had planned for a steadily progressing advance with the allies reaching the German border in early 1945. This would give time to clear the ports in western France and to move supplies forward in a timily fashion. The Red Ball Express priority trucking route gave some relief, as did the use of aircraft for cargo runs to the front. Railroads would have been most effective but were ripped up by Allied bombing.

On Tactical Air support;
Air forces naturally tend to see their roles as fighting for air superiority and attacking strategic targets. By 1944 Air Corps Gen Quesda planned to rectify this failure in the ETO by assigning special teams of airmen- including experienced pilots-to accompany spearhead ground units as liaison officers.
The Ninth Air Force had seven tactical fighter bomber groups (each usually of three squadrons) and one photo-recce group, specifically tasked with supporting the ground troops. Each corps division, armorued cabat command and mechanised cavalry group HQ had AAF radio teams. Tactical Air Liaison officers rode radio-equipped jeeps (and sometimes tanks) with forward units vectoring the P-47s into imediate targets just like artillery FOs.

On the M-26.
Development of the M-26 heavy tank was suddenly given high priority in autumn 1944. Weighing 46 tons and mounting a 90mm M3 gun.it was capable of knocking out most German tanks. The Pershing began arriving at the front by February 1945, the 3rd and 9th Armored Divisions reciving the first limited issue. By VE day of the 700 produced 310 were in the ETO and 200 of these were in combat units.

Well there is more but out of time and have beat this subject to death. Hope to meet you on another subject.

that is my thoughts
sonder