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Okay, since Sonder has decided not to rise to the bait - hard to do so when your head is so firmly embedded in the sand - here is some more info on the true state of affairs.

The initial reports are somewhat incomplete, especially for June, so the following precis of the different armored units is given. It wasnt until the second half of August that daily tank reporting became fully systematized.

Analysis of US Medium Tank Strength in Normandy, June-August 1944

2nd AD M-4 Medium Tank T/E was 232. On 27 May it was at T/E, by 30 June, 19 days after initial elements landed, on hand was 205, 88.4 percent of T/E. At that time 5 were in repair, meaning that the operational strength was only 86.2 percent of T/E. By 2 July though replacements brought the division back to 100% of T/E and by 7 July a slight over-strength was achieved when 4 additional replacements were received. On 21 July 51 M-4 75mm were exchanged for 51 M-4 76mm as the division prepared for COBRA. Strengths otherwise remained at 236 as the division was in reserve throughout this period. After COBRA the division remained at or slightly above T/E on hand, although the number in repair remained fairly high as many as 50 were in repair on 2 August but replacements were sufficient to compensate for losses. Overall, in June and July, the division had 66 M-4 75mm and 76mm tanks destroyed. The first 8 bulldozer blade kits were issued between 24 July and 1 August and another 8 were issued during the month for a total of 16 available.

3rd AD M-4 Medium Tank T/E was 232. On 27 May it was at T/E, by 30 June on hand was 204, 87.9 percent of T/E. At that time 8 were in repair, so operational strength was 84.5 percent of T/E. By 2 July though replacements brought the division back to 100% of T/E and by 7 July a slight over-strength was achieved when 4 additional replacements were received. On 21 July 51 M-4 75mm were exchanged for 51 M-4 76mm as the division prepared for COBRA. Strengths otherwise remained at 236 as the division was in reserve throughout this period. Overall, in June and July, the division lost a total of 40 M-4 75mm and 76mm through the end of July. Post-COBRA replacements allowed the division to maintain T/E or slightly higher through the end of the month, although repairs were as high as 35 by 19 August. The first 11 bulldozer blade kits were issued between 24 Jul and 1 August and another 5 were issued during the month for a total of 16 available.

4th AD M-4 Medium Tank T/E was 168 for 75mm and 76mm (gun) and 18 for 105mm-armed. On 22 July when the division began to arrive in Normandy it had 165 gun tanks so was at 98.2 percent of T/E. It had zero M-4 105mm (the type did not arrive in theater until July) so was at zero percent of T/E for that type and was overall at 88.7 percent of T/E. The division remained in reserve until committed to the breakout on 31 July. It received its 18 M-4 105mm on 9 August. On 19 August it received its first 10 M-4 76mm and 8 more on 27 August. Between 12 and 18 August on hand was at 189, 3 over T/E, although 20 to 23 were in repair throughout that period. By 30 August on hand had decreased to 183 of all types, 98.4 percent of T/E. By 9 August the division had received 3 bulldozer blade kits. Overall the division had a total of 21 M-4 tanks of all types destroyed to 27 August.

5th AD M-4 Medium Tank T/E was 168 for 75mm and 76mm (gun) and 18 for 105mm-armed. On 7 August when the division became operational it had 169 M-4 75mm and 18 M-4 105mm on hand, so was over-strength by one. However, it suffered fairly heavy losses in operations near Argentan and by 14 August had only 145 M-4 75mm on hand and 17 M-4 105mm so was at 87.1 percent of T/E. A total of 12 M-4 75mm were in repair so that operational strength was 80.6 percent of T/E. On 19 August it received 17 M-4 76mm as replacements, and by the end of the month had 148 M-4 75mm, 19 M-4 76mm and 17 M-4 105mm on hand, or 98.9 percent of T/E, but 8 remained in repair, so operational strength was 94.6 percent of T/E. The division received 2 bulldozer blade kits on 7 August, but had one destroyed on 19 August, which was not replaced. Overall, the division had 24 M-4 of all types destroyed to 27 August.

6th AD its initial strength wasnt reported, but it was likely similar to that of the 4th and 5th AD. On 6 August, after six days of operations, the division reported 156 M-4 75mm and 18 M-4 105mm on hand with none in repair, 93.5 percent of T/E. By 9 August 2 M-4 75mm and 2 M-4 105mm had been lost, and 4 M-4 75mm were in repair, so that the division was at 91.4 percent on hand to T/E and 88.2 percent operational to T/E. By the end of the month the division had 155 M-4 75mm and 17 M-4 105mm on hand, 92.5 percent of T/E. The division did not receive any M-4 76mm during the month and had only 3 bulldozer blade kits issued on 13 August (one was destroyed on 28 August). Overall, the division had 6 M-4 of all types destroyed through 27 August.

7th AD was at 100 percent of T/E when it became operational on 13 August, 168 M-4 75mm and 18 M4-105mm, with 2 bulldozer blade kits issued. It had heavy losses during the month, losing at least 30 M-4 75mm and 2 M-4 105mm and a total of 36 M-4 of all types by 27 August, leaving on hand at 82.8 percent of T/E. It then received replacements including at least 13 M-4 76mm and 2 M-4 105mm on 28 August, but suffered additional losses. By the end of the month it had 127 M-4 75mm, 13 M-4 76mm and 17 M-4 105mm on hand and was at 84.4 percent of T/E.

2eme Division Blindee was actually operating with a slightly modified U.S. light armor division T/E.

Overall, the situation with the armor divisions was not bad during most of the fighting in Normandy, but all except the 2nd and 3rd were not on the continent or heavily engaged until after 31 July. Nevertheless, all except the 2nd and 3rd Division were consistently under-strength after initial commitment.

70th Tank Bn had an official T/E of 54 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm. On 5 June it apparently had 61 M-4 75mm on hand, including 32 DD tanks. There were no M-4 105mm available and instead the battalion (like the other separate battalions assigned to the initial assault the 741st and 743rd) had an extra 7 M-4 75mm equipped with bulldozer blades to support the engineers during the assault. It appears that the battalion lost 4 DD tanks on 6 June and then suffered heavily while supporting initial operations in the Cotentin. By 11 June it only had 6 M-4 75mm on hand and operational as all remaining DD tanks were withdrawn to be replaced by standard M-4 and many others were transferred to other battalions. However, these were not received until 14 and 15 June, when on hand climbed to 49 and then 56, making the battalion slightly over-strength. By the end of the month the battalion had 53 M-4 75mm on hand, with two in repair, but still had no M-4 105mm. A total of 33 M-4 were lost in June.

In July the battalion lost another 18 M-4, but on 6 July finally received its 6 M-4 105mm tanks. Through 8 July the battalion remained at near full strength then declined to a low of 43 M-4 75mm by 12 July and remained under-strength in M-4 75mm throughout the month, although the 6 M-4 105mm were unscathed. On 23 July, on the eve of COBRA, the battalion had 55 on hand against a T/E of 60, or 91.7 percent.

In August the situation remained good, with 17 M-4 76mm arriving on 11 August. The battalion remained at or slightly above strength throughout August, until the 28th when M-4 strength fell to 54, or 90.0 percent. By August the number of bulldozer blades had declined from 8 to 5 either through combat loss or transfer to other units.

709th Tank Bn arrived on 15 July with 54 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm so was at full strength. It lost 10 M-4 during the month, apparently all between 24 and 31 July. By 6 August it was nearly at T/E with 53 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm. Thereafter its strength fluctuated twice, on 18 August when M-4 75mm strength dropped to 43 and on 29 August when it dropped to 36. In both cases it was brought back to 53 the following day with replacements, so essentially remained under-strength by one throughout the month. The battalion received no M-4 76mm in this period. Received one bulldozer blade kit on 13 August.

712th Tank Bn arrived on 30 June with 53 M-4 75mm but no M-4 105mm, so under-strength by seven. Six M-4 105mm were issued on 3 July and losses apparently were minor for the rest of the month. On 12 July apparently one M-4 75mm was lost and five more on the following day, along with one M-4 105mm, but they were quickly replaced. A total of 19 M-4 75mm and 2 M-4 105mm were lost in total by the battalion during July. During August the battalion was usually short two or three M-4 75mm, but maintained strength of the M-4 105mm at 6. A total of 5 M-4 were lost through 27 August. The battalion received no M-4 76mm in this period. Received one bulldozer blade kit on 12 August.

735th Tank Bn arrived on 17 July with 54 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm, exactly full strength. It remained in reserve and did not suffer any loss during July. The battalion lost 12 M-4 through 27 August, but maintained its strength at 54 M-4 75mm until 30 August, when it dropped to 50 M-4 75mm and 5 M-4 105mm. The battalion received no M-4 76mm in this period. Received one bulldozer blade kit on 1 August.

737th Tank Bn arrived between 12 and 15 July with 54 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm, exactly full strength. It was lightly engaged, losing only 4 M-4 in July, but 17 through 27 August. Nevertheless replacements kept the battalion at full strength to the end of August, except that M-4 105mm strength fell by one on 30 August. The battalion received no bulldozer kits or M-4 76mm.

741st Tank Bn had an official T/E of 54 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm. On 5 June it apparently had 61 M-4 75mm on hand, including 32 DD tanks. There were no M-4 105mm available and instead the battalion (like the other separate battalions assigned to the initial assault the 70th and 743rd) had an extra 7 M-4 75mm equipped with bulldozer blades to support the engineers during the assault. It suffered heavily at OMAHA, apparently losing about 39 M-4. By 11 June it only had 6 M-4 75mm on hand and operational as all remaining DD tanks were withdrawn to be replaced by standard M-4 and many others were transferred as replacements to other battalions. However, replacements were not received until 13 June when 36 arrived. By the end of the month the battalion had returned to full strength of 54 M-4 75mm, but still had no M-4 105mm. Losses during the month totaled 53 M-4.

In July the battalion remained in reserve rebuilding for much of the time, but still lost 6 more M-4. On 3 July it received 6 M-6 105mm, finally bringing it to full strength and it essentially remained at or near full strength until the end of August. The battalion received no M-4 76mm during the period. By 1 August it had 3 bulldozer blade kits remaining, with the other 5 originals either lost or transferred.

743rd Tank Bn had an official T/E of 54 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm. On 5 June it apparently had 61 M-4 75mm on hand, including 32 DD tanks. There were no M-4 105mm available and instead the battalion (like the other separate battalions assigned to the initial assault the 70th and 741st) had an extra 7 M-4 75mm equipped with bulldozer blades to support the engineers during the assault. It did not suffer quite as badly as the 741st at OMAHA, but still lost at least 16 M-4 (apparently though its only loss in June). By 11 June it was reduced to just 3 M-4 by transfers, but built back up to 33 by 14 June. By 29 June it was at full strength of 54 M-4 75mm, but still had no M-4 105mm.

The 6 M-4 105mm were received on 6 July, giving the battalion, which had 59 M-4 75mm at the time, an over-strength. Losses quickly mounted though, reducing the battalion to 46 M-4 75 mm and 6 M-4 105mm by 10 July. The battalion did not reach full strength again until 18 July. Overall, 26 M-4 were lost in July.

By 1 August the strength had fallen again, to 48 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm. Then, except for 4-8 August, the battalion remained well below strength with only 43-51 on hand M-4 75mm. The battalion received no M-4 76mm during the period. By 1 August only 6 bulldozer blade kits remained, falling to 4 either by loss or transfer after 12 August.

745th Tank Bn arrived on 7 June with an over-strength of 58 M-4 75mm, but apparently lost 5 almost immediately. It had no M-4 105mm. During June it lost only 6 M-4 75mm and remained at around full strength for the entire month. In July only 1 M-4 75mm was lost, and the battalion remained at full strength, finally receiving 6 M-4 105mm on 6 July. During August it was again only lightly engaged and remained at full strength. The battalion received no M-4 76mm, but had 5 bulldozer blade kits during August.

746th Tank Bn arrived on 14 June with an over-strength of 58 M-4 75mm but no M-4 105mm. With the 70th, 741st and 743rd effectively out of combat the battalion bore the brunt of the early fighting and lost 43 M-4 during June. However, by the end of the month replacements and transfers from the 70th, 741st and 743rd Battalions brought the battalion back to 53 M-4 75mm. On 6 July it received 6 M-4 105mm. Then in July it lost another 45 M-4 75mm and 3 M-4 105mm making it probably the hardest hit battalion of the campaign. By 13 July, despite a steady flow of replacements, the on hand of M-4 75mm had fallen to 40. It was again brought back to full strength at the beginning of August, but fell to 49 M-4 75mm by 11 August when 14 M-4 76mm arrived, followed by 3 more the following day. The battalion then remained over-strength through 17 August when transfers out brought it to T/E. The battalion had 5 bulldozer kits on 1 August and apparently lost one, which was replaced, during the month.

747th Tank Bn arrived 7 June with an over-strength of 58 M-4 75mm but no M-4 105mm. It also suffered heavily in June losing 37 M-4 75mm and like the 746th was only kept near full strength by transfers from the 70th, 741st and 743rd Tank Battalions. At the end of the month it had 56 M-4 75mm on hand. On 6 July it received 6 M-4 105mm and remained at about full strength in the first part of the month and lost only 8 M-4 75mm during the month, apparently all between 12 and 22 July. The battalion remained lightly engaged until 9 August, but then was reduced to 46 M-4 75mm though 14 August. Although it received replacements it remained slightly below strength through the end of the month, with 50 M-4 75mm on hand on 30 August. No M-4 76mm were received during the period and bulldozer kit strength fluctuated between 2 and 4 during the month.

749th Tank Bn arrived 6 July at full strength of 54 M-4 75mm and 6 M-4 105mm. It lost 12 M-4 75mm and 1 M-4 105mm during July, but was able to maintain strength through the end of the month and throughout August. It did not receive M-4 76mm or bulldozer kits.

And last but not least

Attached, assigned and organic

A unit or personnel are attached if temporarily placed in an organization. Subject to the limitations placed in the attachment order the commander of the unit receiving the attachment would exercise the same degree of command and control over the attachment as he would over units organic to his command.

A unit or personnel are assigned if placed under command of an organization where such placement is relatively permanent and/or where such organization controls, administers and provides logistical support to the assigned units and/or personnel.

A unit or personnel are organic when they are assigned to and form an essential part of a military organization. Fundamentally they are part of the units table of organization and equipment.

The distinctions are important for a number of reasons. An attached unit that is attached from another, larger formation benefits in that it has a parent that oversees its operations, logistical needs and welfare. But in World War II, in the interests of streamlining organizations and for efficiency sake, the U.S. Army created a large number of separate combat and combat support battalions. These in theory were supported and administered by group headquarters and would draw logistics support directly from corps or army. In this relationship the group headquarters and battalions were assigned to an army and then were in turn attached to corps and then divisions as needed. Usually the separate battalions themselves were only attached to the group headquarters. Also in theory, the group headquarters was to function as both an administrative and a tactical formation.

This system worked fine for engineers and field artillery, but had problems when applied to armor and tank destroyers. In theory the tanks and tank destroyers were to be grouped at corps or army and attached when and as needed to the divisions that required such support. In the macrocosm tank battalions would be massed and attached to an infantry division with an attacking mission. Armored divisions would be massed for exploitation of an infantry breakthrough. Tank destroyers would be massed and attached to an infantry division (or armored division, although the armored division role was offensive it was believed that its shield against enemy tanks was also the TD) with a defensive mission that was threatened by a mass of enemy tanks. In the microcosm tank companies and platoons would be attached to attacking infantry regiments, battalions or companies for specific missions, while tank destroyers would be attached en mass by group, battalion or company to defeat enemy armor concentrations. That was the fundamental theory behind the U.S. Army tank, armor and TD doctrine and the separate battalions.

Unfortunately the theory did not work as intended in Europe during 1944 and 1945. For many reasons the U.S. Army was incapable of forming sufficient infantry divisions so as to allow the army in the field the luxury of idled divisions. In effect, all infantry divisions were forced more or less to maintain a continuous offensive. In turn that meant that all infantry divisions required armored support. But since the troop basis had never been predicated on one tank battalion per infantry division that meant there were insufficient tank battalions. It was also discovered that the German rarely massed offensive tank concentrations and instead utilized small all-arms reserves in short and intensely violent counterattacks. That meant that the tank destroyers couldnt be massed and instead were distributed more or less evenly along the front. It was also discovered that the program of 1943 that had converted about one-half of the TD battalion from self-propelled to towed in mid organization had been poorly conceived as well and that the self-propelled battalion was much more versatile.

The result was that the decision was made to expand by whatever means the number of tank battalions available and to re-convert the towed TD battalions to self-propelled.

Four of six CDL battalions in theater were eventually converted to standard medium tank battalions but there was a problem. Each CDL battalion consisted of just 18 gun tanks, which meant that all told there were 108 medium tanks available to re-equip four battalions requiring 212, and no light tanks available to fill the requirement for 72. The shortfall could be drawn from theater reserves except that by July those were already dangerously depleted. The shortfall could also be drawn from stocks and production in the US except that was subject to War Department approval and the vagaries of shipping times. It was later calculated that the average shipping time for a major item of equipment like a tank was about 165 days as opposed to the War Department assumption of 75 days, which is what reserve stocks were based upon. Overall, although the decision to begin the conversion process was made in August, it was November and December before it was complete (one of the converted battalions, the 740th, first saw action against KG Pieper on 18 December 1944).

Similarly, the conversion process for the TD battalions was also lengthy. Some M-18 battalions began to arrive in theater in August and September and numbers excess M-18 TD, followed by M-36 TD, began to arrive in October and November. The excess were utilized to convert existing M-10 battalions in a regular program, with the excess M-10 in turn going to convert towed battalions (and also to meet various Lend-Lease requirements). But again, building the excess numbers required (36 per battalion for about 20-odd battalions) took time. In the end the conversion process continued in the ETO through the end of hostilities.

The result was that after strenuous effort, on 1 January 1945 there were 12 armored divisions, 33 infantry divisions and three airborne divisions either on the continent or in England. Available to support them were 28 separate medium tank battalions, two separate light tank battalions and two MX tank battalions. Thus the ETO was short five to eight medium tank battalions if the intent was to attach one separate medium tank battalion per infantry or airborne division. There were also 41 SP and 11 towed tank destroyer battalions available. Although some of the SP battalions were still in the process of converting from towed, this meant that in theory all but four armored or infantry divisions could have had a SP battalion attached and that every division, including airborne could have a TD battalion attached with four left over.

And by the end of the war this situation still essentially pertained. As of 8 May 1945 there were 15 armored, 42 infantry and four airborne divisions available. They were supported by 35 separate medium tank battalions and the same 2 separate light tank and 2 MX battalions as in January. Thus the ETO was now short seven to 11 medium tank battalions if the intent remained to attach one separate medium tank battalion per infantry or airborne division if anything the situation was worse than in January. Reinforcements and continuing conversion had greatly improved the TD situation though, there were now 57 SP and only four towed battalions available, enough to equip every armored and infantry division with a SP battalion and every airborne division with a towed battalion.

As someone saying "let the games begin."

Okay, lets see if we can clear up things some. I was able to access the following at the Library of Congress today.

From Allied Landing Craft of World War II (originally published in 1944 with a subsequent supplement as ON1226-Allied Landing Craft and Ships), Naval Institute Press, reprint 1985.

The LCT 1 and 2 were very similar, although the 1 was considered a prototype and was mostly used for training only. British designs, they could only operate on a steeply sloped beach a maximum 1/32 slope. Design load was 3 40-ton or 6 25-ton tanks or 6 16-ton tanks or 250 tons or cargo (since they were Brit designs I assume that meant Imperial tons). The exit ramp was 12 feet wide, but was somewhat limited by the armored gangway doors behind the ramp (this was a common feature in the UK designed LCT 1, 2, 3 and 4).

The LCT 3 was a slightly larger UK design and could accommodate up to 5 40-ton tanks or 10 loaded 3-ton trucks or 300 tons of cargo. It could also land on a steeper beach of greater than 1/35 slope. The exit was still 12 feet wide.

The LCT 4 was also a UK design and could accommodate 6 40-ton or 9 30-ton tanks or 12 loaded 3-ton trucks or 350 tons of cargo. The exit ramp was actually 14 feet wide, but the entrance to the ramp is clearly marked on the deck plans as 13 feet wide, while the clearance between the open gangway doors was given as 11 feet. A major advantage of this type was that it could beach on as gentle as a 1/150 slope.

The LCT 5 was the US version based upon the British design. It could accommodate 5 30-ton or 4 40-ton or 3 50-ton tanks or 9 loaded trucks or 150 tons of cargo. It could beach on a 1/120 slope. However, the exit maximum width (although it had no gangway doors obstructing the exit) was just 12 7 wide (illustrating how difficult it is to precise sometimes, the supplement gives the width as 12 6!).

The LCT 6 was also a US design, the major change being that it could be loaded from the rear as well as over the bow ramp. It could accommodate 4 medium tanks (presumably Shermans were meant) or 3 50-ton tanks (given as M-6) or 150 tons of cargo. The exit however was only 12 4 wide (although again the supplement is slightly different 12 6) and the ramp was only 12 7.

The LCT 8 was the last British design and were building at the end of 1944 Im uncertain if they ever saw operational use in the war. They could accommodate 8 heavt tanks, although the supplement identifies those as Shermans or 13 loaded 3-ton trucks (supplement 12) or 350 tons of cargo. The exit was much wider than the earlier designs at 15 feet with a 16 5 ramp.

The LSM was intended as a all-purpose cargo carrier and could accommodate 5 medium or 3 heavy tanks to a maximum of 150 tons. Its exit was 14 feet wide.

As far as LST go, the Maraicaibo conversions could hold 18 Churchills or 22 25-ton tanks or 33 trucks. The Boxers could hold 13 40-ton or 20 25-ton tanks and 36 3-ton trucks (on the main deck). Unfortunately there was no information on the ramps. Both were more or less considered to be learning exercises and somewhat of a failure in some ways.

The LST (2) was a US purpose built design incorporating the lessons learned. They could hold 13 40-ton or 20 25-ton tanks and 35 (or 36) 2.5 or 3-ton trucks loaded to a max gross weight of 10 tons). The exit was 14 feet wide (the supplement makes it 13 3) and the ramp was 15 4.

The LST (3) was the UK design. It could hold 15 40-ton or 27 25-ton tanks and 14 loaded 3-ton trucks. It had an exit width of 16 6 and an 18-foot wide ramp.

Some very interesting information on LST limitations may be found in Ships Without Names: The Story of the Royal Navys Tank Landing Ships of World War II, Brian MacDermott, Arms and Armor Press, 1992. The main limitation on beaching on the LST (2) was actually its load limit. It was designed to ground on a 1/50 slope, carrying a 500-ton load, 72 tons of fuel, 50 tons of water, and a full crew and troop complement. A full load of tanks would mean a 700-720 ton load, with vehicles on the main deck it would go to 850 tons or more. In that case it would have to land on a much steeper beach 1/30 or more or would have to unload over pontons, Rhinos, or on a jetty or hardstand.

Finally, some more information from Norman Friedmans US Amphibious Ships and Craft Naval Institute Press, 2002. He specifically mentions the postwar Marine requirement for a craft capable of more easily accommodating the M-26, which resulted first in the LCM 6 and then the LCM 8. The wartime LCM 3 could hold a Sherman just barely since it had a maximum internal width of 10 9. He also mentions one of the early problems with the Maricaibo LST the ramp was designed for the 25-ton tank specification, so that the Churchill had to be driven slowly enough to not damage the ramp.

So all the early LCT designs had major limitations on load limits and exits. The load limit was partially solved in the 5 and 6, but the exit width remained problematical. And like the LST the larger the load the fewer tanks that could be accommodated and the steeper the beach that was required.